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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses whistleblowing from the perspective of Floridi’s informa-
tion ethics (IE). Although there is a vast literature on whistleblowing using micro-ethical 
(egopoietic) or meso-ethical (sociopoietic) frameworks, whistleblowing has previously not 
been researched using a macro-ethical or ecopoietic framework. This paper is the first to ex-
plicitly do so. 
Empirical research suggests whistleblowing is a process rather than a single decision and ac-
tion. I argue this process evolves depending on how whistleblowing is facilitated (positively 
or negatively) throughout that process, i.e. responding to whistleblowers and providing in-
formation about whistleblowing activity. The paper develops a typology of whistleblowing 
facilitation to complement Floridi’s IE. 
The findings suggest that for whistleblowing to be beneficial to the informational environ-
ment, facilitation must filter out untrue whistleblowing, and achieve closure with the whistle-
blower, especially when whistleblowing is mistaken or deliberately false. I also find that pub-
lishing information about whistleblowing activity can be beneficial for the informational en-
vironment, but only if all organizations or all regulators do so. 
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1. Introduction 
Whistleblowing is ‘the disclosure by organization members of illegal, immoral or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to 
effect action’ (Miceli & Near, 1984: 689). Whistleblowing always involves a disclosure of 
information. Two recent examples have raised questions around the ethical status of the in-
formation disclosed by whistleblowers. 
Wikileaks is a contested whistleblowing channel. Some have welcomed it as a harbinger of 
democracy and transparency, while others demonize it as too disruptive to international 
diplomacy. Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing on the NSA Prism and other intelligence 
gathering programs has sparked debates about whether the public knowing that a government 
agency has access to most (if not all) of the meta-data about our conversations and where-
abouts, informs us of a threat to democracy (NSA programs are undemocratic and a human 
rights violation, the argument goes) and hence is justified, or constitutes a threat to democra-
cy because revealing the scope of NSA programs undermines their effectiveness in protecting 
democracy. 
Resolving these debates is not the aim of this paper. The analysis in this paper provides a 
novel prescriptive approach for evaluating the ethical status of the information disclosed 
through whistleblowing. Whistleblowing has so far been researched and analyzed at a micro-
ethical and meso-ethical level. There is a vast literature focusing on the whistleblower: their 
motives, their psychological ‘big 5’ characteristics, the wrongdoings people are more or less 
likely to blow the whistle on, the retaliation they experience, etc. Good overviews of that lit-
erature can be found in Near, Miceli and Dworkin (2008) and Mesmer-Magnus and Viswes-
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varan (2005). Brown (2008) offers the most comprehensive study of organizational factors 
influencing whistleblowing to date, and there is also a stream focusing on rationales and legal 
aspects of whistleblowing policies (Lewis, 2010; Vandekerckhove, 2006, 2010; Vaughn, 
2013). A recent status quaestionis of the field of whistleblowing research can be found in 
Brown, Lewis, Moberly and Vandekerckhove (2014). Whistleblowing has never been studied 
from a macro-ethical point of view, i.e. from the perspective of an ethics of environment. Lu-
ciano Floridi’s information ethics (IE) is such a macro-ethical approach because it regards 
information as intrinsically valuable and it provides a framework to evaluate a practice in 
terms of the extent to which whistleblowing causes or prevents harm to informational objects 
and regards information as intrinsically valuable. That is a first contribution of this paper to 
the literature on whistleblowing. It is the first paper to explore whistleblowing from an 
ecopoietic perspective. My aim, in line with Floridi’s IE, is not to provide an ethical evalua-
tion that is superior or overrides egopoietic or sociopoietic evaluations but rather offer com-
plementary insights that can be useful for practitioners and policy makers when designing 
and implementing whistleblowing policies, and when debating the value of public whistle-
blowing. 
A second contribution of this paper stems from the argument in this paper that whistleblow-
ing cannot be evaluated separately from its facilitation. Floridi (2011a) described journalists 
and leaks sites as facilitators of whistleblowing. It is however important to note that not all 
whistleblowing constitutes a disclosure to the public via the media. Empirical research shows 
only a tiny minority of whistleblowers try to raise a concern through the media (Brown, 
2008; PCaW, 2013). Other whistleblowing might be to a regulatory agency, a professional 
body, or might even remain internal to the organisation. Research further suggests whistle-
blowing is not a one-off or a single act. Rather it is a process of escalating a concern though 
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repeatedly raising the concern in different ways to different recipients depending on how the 
whistleblower is responded to (Brown, 2008; Miceli & Near, 1992, PCaW, 2013, Rothschild 
& Miethe, 1999). Thus the whistleblowing literature distinguishes between internal and ex-
ternal whistleblowing but nevertheless regards both as one whistleblowing process in which 
external whistleblowing is preceded by internal whistleblowing (Near et al, 2008). Organisa-
tional whistleblowing policies and procedures are regarded as potentially facilitating safe and 
effective internal whistleblowing (Berry, 2004; Brown & Latimer, 2011; Brown, Meyer, 
Wheeler & Zuckerman, 2014; Vandekerckhove, Brown & Tsahuridu, 2014). Organisational 
whistleblowing policies and procedures facilitate internal whistleblowing successfully if the 
whistleblower does not experience retaliation (safe) and the alleged wrongdoing is stopped 
(effective). However, organisational whistleblowing policies and procedures come in differ-
ent shapes and forms. Some entail multiple channels and interfaces with independent case-
handlers (ACCA, 2016), while others merely consist of a poster on the office wall encourag-
ing employees to speak up, or entail nothing more than mentioning in the code of conduct 
that raising a concern is desirable (Hassink et al, 2007; Moberly & Wylie, 2011). Needless to 
say that not all internal facilitation of whistleblowing is successful. Internal whistleblowers 
are often retaliated against, and even more often find their concern ignored (PCaW, 2013). 
This paper also contributes to the literature by developing a typology of whistleblowing facil-
itation which I apply to an analysis of whistleblowing as ecopoiesis. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I sketch Floridi’s IE and discuss how 
its ecopoietic characteristics differ from other ethical frameworks, in particular virtue ethics 
and previous approaches in information ethics. The section after that brings together previous 
empirical research on whistleblowing to argue that whistleblowing is usually facilitated in 
more than one way. I then proceed to bring the two together in a section that contains the con-
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tributions of this paper. Namely I develop a typology of whistleblowing facilitation and pro-
vide a systematic analysis of whistleblowing from the perspective of ecopoietic IE. One of 
the distinctions the analysis makes use of is that between true and false whistleblowing. I dis-
cuss the difficulty of managing false whistleblowing in a separate section. I conclude the pa-
per with implications for practitioners and policy makers. 
2. Information Ethics (IE) as ecopoiesis 
Floridi started to develop his approach to Information Ethics (IE) at the end of the 1990s in a 
context of an increased interest in computer ethics and privacy issues. Although Floridi writes 
that ICT brought about a new Copernican revolution, the resulting IE paradigm is not re-
stricted to issues affecting any form of ICT (Floridi, 2008, 2010a). 
Floridi (2008) argues the science triggered by the Turing machine and current ICTs re-ontol-
ogize us. They displace humanity from its central position in both our understanding of the 
world and of ourselves, even more so than Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud did. ICTs are not 
just enhancing or augmenting devices with an interface panel through which robots like 
dishwashers 'enter' our human world. ICTs 'engineer environments that the user is enabled to 
enter through (possibly friendly) gateways' (Floridi, 2010a: 13). This engineered environment 
does not enter our human world. Rather, we use (digital) interfaces to enter or be present in 
the infosphere. For Floridi (2010a: 13), humanity migrates 'from its Umwelt to the infosphere 
itself'. Hence the infosphere is reality seen from an informational level of abstraction. 
The new understanding of the world and of ourselves - re-ontologization - is not consistent 
with an understanding of responsibilities and duties that sees humans as merely users or pro-
ducers of information. Rather - this is a characteristic of Floridi's IE - we need an ethical ap-
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proach that understands humans as part of the infosphere. The implication is that we are in-
formational objects amongst and interacting with other informational objects. These interac-
tions constitute the environment in which every informational object has intrinsic value. This 
means that IE is ontocentric, not anthropocentric. The flourishing of what is - informational 
entities - is good. The responsibilities and duties are ecopoietic, meaning they are duties and 
responsibilities of making or constructing the environment (the infosphere). IE is a conse-
quentialist ethics. What matters are the effects of certain actions or arrangements on the status 
of informational entities - their well-being as informational entities. Floridi (2010a) posits 4 
fundamental principles of IE as an ecopoietic approach: 
(0) entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law) 
(1) entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere 
(2) entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere 
(3) the flourishing of informational entities as well as of the whole infosphere ought to be 
promoted by preserving, cultivating and enriching their properties. 
It is clear from this that in IE, entropy is evil. In IE, entropy is defined as any form of destruc-
tion or corruption of informational entities, or ‘any form of impoverishment of Being’ (Flori-
di 2010b: 84). Thus confusing, meaningless or misleading information causes entropy in the 
infosphere if it harms informational entities. Any kind of destruction, corruption, pollution, or 
depletion of information entities is entropy. We ought to act so that informational entities 
flourish, i.e. so they can be what they are in terms of information: meaningful, truthful, and 
with minimum entropy. Floridi (2011b) and Turilli and Floridi (2009) insist information im-
plies truth; false semantic data is not information. Thus misinformation or disinformation per 
se generate entropy, and hence constitute unethical acts in IE because these deplete Being in 
the infosphere. However, while the truthfulness of semantic data is a necessary condition for 
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an ethical informational act (such as whistleblowing), it is not a sufficient condition. As IE is 
consequentialist, it is necessary to assess the impact that the informational act has on the in-
fosphere and on all the informational entities existing in it.   
Egopoietic - who should I be - or sociopoietic - how should I relate to others - approaches to 
how humans act and interact through information do not suffice to capture the re-ontologiz-
ing implications of the information age. Users and producers do not merely interact with the 
infosphere as input and output. Rather, they are part of the infosphere, and so are non-human 
information entities (an organization, a report, a machine, a product, etc). Egopoiesis - who 
should I be - does not suffice for current issues around information in our society because the 
infosphere is too complex. I have responsibilities to an environment not just because I flour-
ish in that environment but also because others who do not affect me in any way and never 
will, both shape and shape themselves through that environment in ways I cannot foresee. In 
that sense our interactions include those we are not aware of. These interactions are neverthe-
less real. A sociopoietic approach evaluates human interactions mediated by information, i.e. 
libel, privacy, hacking, information asymmetries, etc. The considerations here are with regard 
to other users and producers (now or in the future). In Floridi's IE however, we consider 
agents as part of the infosphere, not merely as users or producers of something that is distinct 
to them. Interactions between agents or of an agent’s self-action are assessed on the basis of 
their impact on the infosphere; a good impact means an increased flourishing of information-
al entities. Hence a macro and ecopoeitic IE that enables us to conceive of our responsibilities 
towards the infosphere and as part of the infosphere, is an additional and useful ethical per-
spective. That is how Floridi presents his macro-IE. Not as an ethical perspective that makes 
other perspectives outdated or inferior, but as an ethical perspective we did not have yet 
whilst our world had already changed. 
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3. Whistleblowing and facilitation of whistleblowing 
In the literature on whistleblowing, facilitation of whistleblowing has been described as com-
prising of governance controls that ‘expand opportunities for employee disclosure’ (Berry, 
2004: 2), strategies of ‘institutionalizing improved disclosure channels and investigative re-
sponses’ (Brown et al., 2014: 458), and interventions transforming organizational cultures 
‘from closed hierarchies (in which risks of mistakes or wrongdoing are not openly acknowl-
edged) to more open environments (with more sophisticated systems of ensuring that indi-
viduals and organizations take responsibility for problems and can deal with them in an open, 
constructive and efficient manner)’ (Brown & Latimer, 2011: 147). The assumption in these 
descriptions is that ‘facilitation of whistleblowing’ is an intervention of which the aim is to 
make whistleblowing more successful, i.e. safe for the whistleblower and effective in stop-
ping wrongdoing (Vandekerckhove et al., 2014). In this section I provide evidence that 
whistleblowing is a process rather than a one-off act, and argue that because of this facilita-
tion of whistleblowing is likely to occur a number of times. The implication is that facilita-
tion of whistleblowing can be either successful or unsuccessful, and determines how the 
whistleblowing process will unfold. This has important further implications for the evaluation 
of whistleblowing from an IE perspective. 
Let me briefly set out the argument before fleshing out the empirical basis and specifying fur-
ther implications for the analysis. From an IE perspective, a whistleblower is an information 
entity. It is a person who believes there is wrongdoing and who raises a concern about this. 
Raising the concern constitutes a communication of information (wrongdoing) to another in-
formation entity (recipient) about an information entity (wrongdoer - individuals within the 
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organization, systems within the organization, or the organization as whole). The recipient 
can be a journalist or a leaks site, but can also be a regulatory agency, an NGO, a trade union, 
a professional body, a compliance officer, an internal auditor, a HR manager, etc. If whistle-
blowing is a process, i.e. it occurs through a sequence of communications of information to 
different recipients, then the impact of the whistleblowing communication on the infosphere 
and all information entities that exist within it is partly determined by the characteristics of 
the recipient as information entity. Why? Each of these recipients can attempt to facilitate 
successful whistleblowing (safe and effective) but they differ as to who will have access to 
the whistleblower’s information and the kind of interventions or sanctions they can take to-
wards the wrongdoers. Hence because different recipients can impact the flourishing of in-
formation entities in different ways, for the ethical evaluation of whistleblowing it matters 
who the recipient is. I unpack this argument in the remainder of this section. I will first pro-
vide empirical evidence for the claim that whistleblowing is a process, and will then clarify 
different characteristics of recipients. 
Research shows whistleblowing involves a process of escalating a concern, rather than one 
single decision to speak out or not. Brown (2008), Miceli and Near (1992), and PCaW (2013) 
provide empirical evidence that whistleblowing typically starts with workers raising a con-
cern with their line manager, or in any case inside their organization (internal whistleblow-
ing). Findings from PCaW (2013) suggest not all whistleblowers escalate their concern to an 
external recipient. Of a sample of 1,000 people who called Public Concern at Work in the UK 
for whistleblowing advice, 13.2% had not raised a concern with anyone, 38.5% made one 
attempt to raise their concern, 34.2% two attempts, 11.9% three times, and 2.2% four times. 
The findings also suggest the most likely response from management when whistleblowers 
raise a concern internally is a non-response; they are simply ignored. There were some differ-
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ences across industry sectors with those in the financial sector indicating a higher likelihood 
that action to stop the wrongdoing was taken. Those in the health and care sector showed the 
highest expectations that wrongdoing would be stopped but were also most likely to describe 
their situation as worsening throughout the process (PCaW, 2013).  
In Brown (2008) only 3% blew the whistle immediately to the media. In PCaW (2013) that 
was 0.5%. There is also ample evidence that whistleblowers are more likely to raise their 
concern with someone outside of the organization (external whistleblowing) if their internal 
whistleblowing is met with reprisal from management (Donkin, Smith & Brown, 2008; 
Miceli & Near 1992, 1994). PCaW (2013) traces the first 4 attempts whistleblowers make to 
raise their concern. Where whistleblowing remained internal, internal audit and hotlines were 
increasingly used as a recipient as whistleblowers made further attempts to raise their con-
cern, showing a similar pattern to the use of regulators and professional bodies as external 
recipients (PCaW, 2013). This suggests that as the whistleblowing process unfolds the 
whistleblower tends to seek a recipient that shows independence, rather than merely shifting 
from internal to external whistleblowing. 
The implication is that even if we use the word 'whistleblowing' to only denote external 
whistleblowing, we cannot deny the process leading up to external whistleblowing (Miceli & 
Near, 1992). Brown (2008, 2012) and Vandekerckhove (2012) suggest there are two main and 
probably equally important reasons why people do not raise concerns: fear of retaliation, and 
a belief that the wrongdoing will not be dealt with. Hence, whether or not someone makes a 
further attempt to raise a concern, and how they do that is influenced by expected and effec-
tive reactions - i.e. retaliation or support, and being ignored or investigated and corrected. 
Therefore we can say that whistleblowing is determined by how successful the facilitation is 
at each instance where the whistleblower raises his/her concern. 
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Vandekerckhove (2010) posits a 3-tiered model of whistleblowing distinguishing one internal 
and two external tiers (to a regulator and public). The model is based on an analysis of leg-
islative developments in the 1990s in Australia and the UK, and has recently been adopted in 
the Council of Europe Recommendation on Protecting Whistleblowers (Council of Europe, 
2014). The 3-tiered model (figure 1) maintains a balance between on the one hand the public 
disclosure of information about organizational wrongdoing (i.e. the public’s right to know) 
and on the other hand the organizational interests in keeping such information out of the pub-
lic realm.  
------------------ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  ----------------------- 
In its first tier, which is internal, the information does not leave the organization. Workers 
raise their concerns with supervisors, top management, board members, or other designated 
persons (ethics officer, compliance manager, auditor, or internal hotline). In the second tier, 
the whistleblower raises his/her concern externally, to an agent acting on behalf of the wider 
society. This includes regulators and enforcement agencies. This second tier is only accessed 
when first tier whistleblowing is unsuccessful, or in other words, when the organization fails 
to correct the wrongdoing for which it carries responsibility, fails to deal adequately with the 
concern being raised and the person raising it, or when the whistleblower has grounds to be-
lieve raising concern internally will lead to reprisal or cover-up. Hence, the second tier is an 
external one, but the public would not know the whistle had been blown to that external re-
cipient. Still, this second tier recipient is expected to investigate and take action towards the 
organization where the wrongdoing occurred. At this stage, the content of the concern the 
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whistleblower raises will not only include information about the wrongdoing, but also about 
the organization’s failure to deal with the internal whistleblowing in a correct way. 
The third tier is also external and involves recipients that will make the whistleblowing in-
formation known to the wide public. In addition to the content of the concern of the whistle-
blower raised at the second tier, third tier whistleblowing concerns will include information 
about various informational entities: the wrongdoing, about the organization’s failure to deal 
with internal whistleblowing in a correct way, and about a regulator or other second tier re-
cipient not taking the concern seriously. In this sense, third tier recipients function as watch-
dogs over second tier recipients’ failure to take their deterring or rectifying duties seriously. 
In short, the principle of the 3-tiered model is not that organizations become directly account-
able to the wider society for their practices, but that they are held accountable for dealing ad-
equately with concerns being raised with them and the persons raising them (Vandekerck-
hove, 2010). The 3-tiered model (figure 1) shows different interactions between information-
al entities in the context of whistleblowing. The full arrows in figure 1 indicate the escalation 
of raising a concern in the whistleblowing process. The dashed arrows indicate information 
about whistleblowing activity. This is a new phenomenon that is likely to become more 
common in the future. Some companies (e.g. Siemens) include in their annual report data on 
number and type of concerns raised through their whistleblowing hotline. The Code of Prac-
tice 2013 that was published by the UK Whistleblowing Commission stipulates as standard 
eight: ‘Where an organization publishes an annual report, that report should include informa-
tion about the effectiveness of the whistleblowing’ (Whistleblowing Commission, 2013). 
Also in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Au-
thority (PRA) do not demand such data to be made public, but require companies to have that 
data available for regulators (FCA, 2015). Some regulators (e.g. Securities and Exchange 
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Commission in the US, Financial Conduct Authority and Care Quality Commission in the 
UK) include data on number and types of concerns raised with them by whistleblowers in 
their annual reports. A recent guideline for the UK Department for Business, Innovation, and 
Skills (BIS, 2015) signals to regulators that the annual reporting of data on whistleblowing 
activity will become a requirement. 
What the 3-tiered model shows is that the impact of whistleblowing on the infosphere is very 
different depending on which tier the facilitation occurs at. Recipients at different tiers have a 
different impact on the organization, the wrongdoer, the whistleblower, and other informa-
tional entities. This is so when the whistleblowing disclosure entails true semantic data - i.e. 
information. Organizational and professional reputations can be harmed. A further complica-
tion is that whistleblowers can be mistaken, in which case there is misinformation - uninten-
tionally false semantic data. People can also use whistleblowing channels for disinformation - 
intentionally communicated false semantic data. Successful facilitation will expose such acts 
for what they are: misinformation or disinformation. The lower the tier whistleblowing oc-
curs at, the easier this seems to accomplish. Yet it might be harder to get the whistleblower to 
accept it. I will return to this difficulty later in the paper. The point I want to make here is that 
because whistleblowing is a process of escalating a concern, the question of how whistle-
blowing can be evaluated from an IE perspective can be reformulated as the question of what 
the optimal facilitation of whistleblowing is. Following Floridi’s IE principles and Vandeker-
ckhove’s 3-tiered model, the answer is that as the organization’s flourishing as an informa-
tional entity should be promoted whilst negatively impacting the flourishing of as few infor-
mation entities as possible. But what if the internal facilitation does not lead to successful 
whistleblowing? How is the infosphere impacted by further whistleblowing at the second or 
even third tier? I answer the questions in the next section. 
 14
4. Whistleblowing and ecopoeisis 
Organizations are information entities that seek to promote their flourishing by producing 
other information entities that communicate semantic data about them: they have websites, 
advertise their products or services, publish various reports, have mission statements, codes 
of conduct, etc. It is an implicit claim of that semantic data that it is information - i.e. true 
semantic data (apart from some exceptions such as ads that use hyperbole). Within IE, organ-
isations that produce false semantic data would still be informational entities, but the produc-
tion of false semantic data causes entropy in the infosphere as misinformation and disinfor-
mation can deplete or harm other informational entities such as consumers, investors, com-
petitors, or other producers of information. There are specific informational entities however 
that make the implicit truth claims unproblematic. Institutions such as accounting, auditing, 
consumer groups, regulators, and a free press allow commercial and government organisa-
tions to flourish as information entities. More precisely, appropriate rules of informational 
transparency which these institutions impose and embody allow organisations to flourish 
through the production of regulated information entities. Turilli and Floridi (2009: 107) wrote 
that informational transparency can be ethically enabling ‘when it provides the information 
necessary for the endorsement of ethical principles’ or ‘when it provides details on how in-
formation is constrained’. The ethical principles here are producing trustworthy information 
(true semantic data that is perceived as such) and a neutral (no-harm) or beneficial working of 
organisations for their stakeholders. Reporting requirements such as financial statements, en-
vironmental impact audits, or reports in the areas of equality and diversity, or supply chain 
responsibilities all enable the second ethical principle. Third party verification of the reported 
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information can increase its validity and hence enable the first ethical principle. However, 
voluntary standards or regulation with regard to how that information was produced and is 
constrained - e.g. auditing standards, financial reporting rules, Global Reporting Initiative 
frameworks, etc - can be enhancing or even be necessary for these ethically enabling effects 
to occur. Some institutions provide validity of information not by producing additional in-
formation but by their ability to do so. For example, in a country with a free press, there is no 
need to actually print in the newspapers that elections were fair. The absence of news about 
unfair elections conveys the validity and fairness of the elections. Hence, a free press pro-
motes the flourishing of elections as information entities by being able to report on any un-
fairness, rather than actually having to report on fairness. 
How do the above considerations apply to whistleblowing ? Consider organizations A, B, C, 
and D who produce semantic data about themselves. Three of these produce semantic data 
pA, pB, pC, where p is 'we are a safe organization to work for'. Organization D produces qD 
where q is a report showing accidents decreased by 50% last year. There are many potential 
users of that information (at least these users believe the semantic data is true). Customers 
might be interested in buying products from organizations with safe workplaces. Hence they 
would choose among A, B, and C, but not D because they rely on communications that claim 
accidents happen in D but not in A, B, and C. Investors looking for a new investee might 
choose A, B, or C because there is little risk of costly accidents. On the other hand, they 
might prefer D because if the organization continues to decrease its accidents it will save 
costs and hence its shares are likely to rise meaning a win for the investor. Note that organiza-
tions A, B, C and D are not only producers of p and q but also users. The customers and in-
vestors they attract because of p and q will make a difference to them. So the questions IE 
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poses with regard to whistleblowing are: what does whistleblowing do to p and q, and to the 
infosphere in which p and q are produced and used?  
Consider also a whistleblower who produces semantic data wA that organization A had three 
fatal accidents last year but covered them up. If wA is true, it exposes pA as false semantic 
data, and thus A as untrustworthy. It might also cast doubt on pB and pC. B and C might in-
deed be safe organizations, but they too could be liars. Finally, the compound information 
pA, qD, and wA gives us the knowledge that D is rigorous and honest about its safety moni-
toring. Hence, wA has caused entropy (pB and pC) but it has also made qD flourish. Investors 
will want to shy away from A, and will be wary of B and C. Organization D however has just 
become more attractive. Depending on how strongly customers feel about safe workplaces, 
their purchasing behavior might also be affected.  
Now, assume that organization B has an internal whistleblowing procedure and publishes in 
its annual report the number of concerns raised internally as well as investigations and sanc-
tions taken in response to those internal concerns - this is information pWB. Organization C 
does not have such practices. In this situation, wA does not affect the informational value of 
pB but it still lowers that of pC. Hence, pWB (a dotted line in figure 1) is an instance of in-
formational transparency by B, which is ethically enabling B to produce other information 
about itself.  
Of course, what A’s whistleblower discloses (wA) might be false semantic data, and as such 
either misinformation or disinformation. This is important and I will come back to that possi-
bility further on in this section. Here, I have argued that whistleblowing can be good in terms 
of IE because it can make information objects flourish for what they are by exposing false 
semantic data produced by organizations as false. A preliminary conclusion is then that 
whistleblowing can be good when it is information, i.e. when semantic data is true. 
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This preliminary conclusion needs to be qualified. I pointed out that even if whistleblowing 
exposes organizational semantic data as false, and thus enhances the infosphere, it also causes 
some entropy: it harms organizations exposed as liars, and might cast doubt on informational 
validity of other organizations, as people might become cynical towards any communication 
for organizations. Whether the benefits outweigh the harms depends, I argue, on how 
whistleblowing is facilitated. The remainder of this section offers an analysis to arrive at a 
qualification of good whistleblowing within IE. 
For that analysis a couple of distinctions are needed. I have argued that whistleblowing is a 
process that involves raising a concern through three tiers depending on how the whistle-
blowing is responded to at each instance. I have also argued that organizations and regulators 
can produce information about concerns raised with them and how these were handled. I have 
further argued that how the whistleblowing process unfolds is determined by the way it is fa-
cilitated at each step of the process. Thus whether or not and with whom the concern will be 
raised next depends on how a recipient responds to the whistleblowing and whether or not 
there is communication from that recipient about whistleblowing activity (full and dotted 
lines in figure 1). For the analysis that follows I consider r to be an adequate response (con-
cern was investigated and there is no harm to the whistleblower) whilst ¬r is an inadequate 
response; s designates that there is information about whistleblowing activity whilst ¬s means 
there is no such communication. I thus arrive at four facilitation modes from the possible 
combinations. I will first discuss the entropy effects of facilitation modes at organizational 
and regulatory level (tiers 1 and 2). I will then discuss the entropy effect with regard to public 
whistleblowing and argue that what constitutes r and s at this level is different. Table 1 
presents an overview of how whistleblowing affects entropy in the infosphere across the three 
whistleblowing tiers and across different modes of facilitation. 
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--------------- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ------------------ 
r Ʌ s   There is an adequate response to a whistleblowing concern and there is also 
information about whistleblowing activity. Entropy is removed from the infosphere, both 
where whistleblowing is true as well as where whistleblowing is false (misinformation or 
desinformation). Wrongdoing has been stopped, the mistaken whistleblower does not suffer 
reprisal, and intentionally false whistleblowing is sanctioned. Moreover, the organization or 
the regulator reports about these activities. This functions as informational transparency sup-
porting the validity of information from the organization or regulator. What this additional 
information (report on whistleblowing activity) communicates is precisely that this organiza-
tion is willing and able to correct wrongdoing occurring under its own responsibility. For 
regulators this is that it is willing and able to correct wrongdoing in or by organizations and 
sectors that it regulates on the public’s behalf. Thus r Ʌ s allows organizations and regulators 
to flourish as informational objects in the infosphere. 
r Ʌ ¬s  There is an adequate response but no communication about whistleblowing 
activity. The adequate response (r) prevents whistleblowing from escalating further to tier 
two or three. It thus prevents entropy in the infosphere for those situations where further 
whistleblowing would cause entropy. But because there is no communication about whistle-
blowing activity (¬s) no entropy is caused or removed. There is no informational trans-
parency that enhances the flourishing of organizations or regulators as informational objects. 
Note this would be different if we would take into regard that some organizations and regula-
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tors report on whistleblowing activity but others do not (cf. pWB but no pWC). Preventing 
entropy through informational transparency might only occur if either all or none communi-
cate about whistleblowing activity. I do not take this complexity into account in the analysis. 
¬r Ʌ s  There is communication about whistleblowing activity but no adequate re-
sponse to the whistleblowing. This situation arises when an organization or regulator includes 
data on number and types of concerns raised with them (s), yet fails to stop the wrongdoing 
or the whistleblower is retaliated against (¬r). Pittroff (2014) uses legitimacy theory to ex-
plore this. Legitimacy theory posits it is not important to know how an organization is actual-
ly behaving, rather it is important what society perceives and knows about the behavior of the 
organization. In this sense, a communication about whistleblowing activity can be a merely 
symbolic instrument to create a legitimacy façade. This can be maintained as long as an orga-
nization can credibly signal that it meets the expectations of society. However, without ade-
quate responses to whistleblowing concerns, communication about whistleblowing activity 
makes the organization – as informational object – prone to a legitimacy-gap. We can expect 
such a mode of facilitation will push whistleblowers to raise a concern about this gap to a 
regulator or – if the regulator incurs the legitimacy-gap – to the media. Hence the effect of ¬r 
Ʌ s is that it increases entropy in the infosphere unless whistleblowing is escalated to the next 
tier.  
¬r Ʌ ¬s  There is no adequate response to a concern being raised and also no communi-
cation about whistleblowing activity. This causes more entropy. If the whistleblowing is true 
then not escalating the concern to the next tier fails to prevent entropy because the organiza-
tion or regulator in question continues to produce false semantic data. If the whistleblowing is 
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false, an inadequate response (including ignoring) might lead the whistleblower to escalate 
their (false) concern to the next tier, thereby causing more entropy in the infosphere. 
Entropy effects of whistleblowing are different when whistleblowing is facilitated by journal-
ists or leaks sites to the public (tier three in figure 1 and table 1). This situation occurs when 
there is no adequate response (¬r) at previous tiers. The whistleblower has raised the concern 
with the organization and the regulator, but the wrongdoing was not stopped or the whistle-
blower is experiencing retaliation. A situation of inadequate response (¬r) also exists where 
the whistleblower knows what happened to previous whistleblowers who raised their concern 
with the organization or the regulator and were ignored or retaliated against. Edward Snow-
den’s whistleblowing on NSA surveillance programs is a good example. He blew the whistle 
through the media because he knew what happened to William Binney and Thomas Drake 
who had previously tried internal whistleblowing routes (Radack & McClellan, 2011). Under 
UK legislation, whistleblowing to the media remains a protected disclosure if the whistle-
blower had good reasons to believe raising the concern with the organization or regulator 
would be ignored or lead to retaliation. Entropy effects of whistleblowing at the third tier 
(whistleblowing to the media) are different from previous tiers because it is unclear what r 
and s are. An adequate response (r) from media is to publish the whistleblowing information 
if it is true, and not to publish if it is false. An adequate response also entails that journalists 
shield their whistleblower sources. The example of Chelsea Manning shows that the possibil-
ity of harming the whistleblower through media publication is real. An inadequate response 
(¬r) would be not to publish if the whistleblowing is true, and publish if the whistleblowing 
is false. Hence, in table 1 not publishing if the whistleblowing is true, and publishing false 
semantic data (¬r) always results in more overall entropy. However, unlike recipients at pre-
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vious tiers there is no other action the media as recipient can take to stop the wrongdoing ex-
cept publishing whistleblowing information about wrongdoing or whistleblower retaliation. If 
the whistleblowing was intentionally false then the media has no means to sanction the disin-
forming whistleblower except not to publish. The implication is that whistleblowing through 
the media must trigger other actors to stop the wrongdoing, e.g. a parliamentary commission 
or reforming the regulator that failed to take appropriate action. For this to happen, informa-
tional transparency is an important factor. 
In whistleblowing to the media, informational transparency is based on the reputation of the 
journalist or the media outlet that they work with high standards of investigate journalism. 
This functions as additional information about whistleblowing activity (s). Hence (s) - the 
reputation of the journalist - validates any whistleblowing information published. Tabloid 
journalists have a reputation of publishing semantic data that might or might not be true, and 
would thus constitute (¬s). In table 1 (r Ʌ ¬s) if the whistleblowing is true results in an over-
all increase of entropy. This is because journalists or media outlets that do not have a strong 
reputation of working with high standards of investigate journalism will not be able to trigger 
other actors in taking action to stop wrongdoing or sanction a disinforming whistleblower 
will not bring about the removal of entropy necessary to outweigh the entropy caused by any 
whistleblowing.  
Table 1 also notes that (r Ʌ ¬s) if the whistleblowing is false as well as (r Ʌ s) if the whistle-
blowing is false have a neutral effect on entropy because nothing is published. From the 
analysis it follows that within IE whistleblowing to the media is only good if true semantic 
data from a whistleblower gets published by facilitators that have a strong reputation of 
working with high standards of investigative journalism. 
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5. True and false whistleblowing, and no whistleblowing at all 
The above analysis urges us to emphasize the importance of ensuring adequate responses to 
whistleblower concerns at the level of the organization and the regulator. However, this can 
be very difficult to achieve, especially when the whistleblowing is false. Vandekerckhove and 
Rumyantseva (2014), reporting on research into the implementation of whistleblowing poli-
cies in the NHS England, give examples of efforts made to achieve closure with the whistle-
blower. One HR manager interviewee gave the following account of the efforts needed to 
convince a mistaken whistleblower that the organization took a concern seriously and is not 
trying to cover-up wrongdoing: 
[…] But we had to sit down with him and explain it to him. [ …] And the Medical Director 
ended up explaining it to him. […] We were a bit nervous that he would take the issue and 
try to make something out of it. But you know, he asked questions and we talked about it 
and he was absolutely satisfied then. But we physically showed him the patient system and 
the two different systems. So I think it is about giving that feedback. I mean we have had 
nurses who’ve raised issues and you get some quite strong nurses who come and raise an 
issue but again the Director of Nursing’s response was ‘Well that’s not actually what’s hap-
pened’. But we will physically sit down and say ‘Look, we’re going to tell you …’ And I 
think I’ve had a couple of letters come via me and we’ve looked into them and again we’ve 
brought them in and said ‘Look, we’re going to explain to you why what you think is the 
case isn’t the case’ and they’ve been happy with that. […] So it has to be that level of feed-
back. (interviewee cited in Vandekerckhove & Rumyantseva, 2014) 
The above concerns whistleblowing that entails unintentionally false semantic data, i.e. the 
whistleblower is mistaken. However, false whistleblowing can also entail intentionally false 
semantic data.  This is known as ‘malicious whistleblowing’ and nearly all whistleblower 
protection legislation features punishment for malicious whistleblowing (Council of Europe, 
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2014; Vandekerckhove, 2006). The ability to distinguish between mistaken and malicious 
whistleblowing is important for tier 1 recipients. They need to be able to evidence the mali-
ciousness because there is always the possibility that the malicious whistleblower makes an 
attempt at tier 2 or 3. The current reality however seems to be that whistleblowers tend to suf-
fer reprisals for true whistleblowing more than organizations are harmed by malicious 
whistleblowing. 
Achieving closure with the whistleblower is an important part of what constitutes an adequate 
response (r), also where whistleblowing is false at tiers one or two. Thus a failure to achieve 
closure would constitute an inadequate response (¬r), and by definition four cells of table 1 
would be empty (tier three cells of columns r Ʌ s, r Ʌ ¬s). In practice however, it might be 
useful to consider situations where responses have been partially adequate at tiers one or two, 
i.e. adequate except for achieving closure. In such cases the wrongdoing has been stopped, a 
mistaken whistleblower has not suffered retaliation, and intentionally false whistleblowing 
has been sanctioned. If the whistleblowing then occurs at tier three, this causes more entropy 
in the infosphere because it raises doubt about the organization’s and the regulator’s abilities 
to respond to whistleblowers and stop wrongdoing. In those situations entropy in the infos-
phere increases, regardless whether the whistleblowing is true or not. 
Where the responses at tiers one or two were inadequate in other respects the truthfulness of 
the whistleblowing does make a difference. If the whistleblowing is true, it removes entropy 
in the infosphere as the disclosure is additional information that enables to distinguish trust-
worthy from less trustworthy organizations (the same reasoning goes for regulators). Trust-
worthy organizations will be those about which there are no whistleblowing disclosures at 
tier 2 and 3. Whether this is because there is no wrongdoing in those organizations or because 
these organizations manage to respond adequately to whistleblowing is irrelevant. Of course, 
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there might be organizations that ‘buy silence’. We can think of organizations that threaten 
their potential whistleblowers, for example by murdering previous whistleblowers (e.g. some 
whistleblowers receive death threats, see for example Gibney, 2013), or by paying them for 
signing a ‘gagging clause’ (i.e. a stipulation in a contract whereby a person foregoes the right 
to communicate about the issue, see for example Guardian, 2013). It is possible such attempts 
to ‘buy silence’ are sometimes successful. But as the two examples evidence, we know peo-
ple sometimes blow the whistle despite such attempts by organizations to ‘buy silence’. It has 
now become standard that whistleblower protection legislation both acknowledges death 
threats as a form of retaliation as well as that gagging clauses are legally void (cf. Council of 
Europe, 2014). 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to the literature by being the first to look at 
whistleblowing from an explicitly ecopoietic perspective, namely Floridi’s IE. Thus the 
analysis explored the value of whistleblowing as information, as well as for users and pro-
ducers of information. I distinguished two types of whistleblowing information. One is the 
information the whistleblower might disclose. The other is information about whistleblowing 
activity organizations and regulators can produce and use. 
Empirical findings about how whistleblowing happens were at the basis of the analysis and 
showed that whistleblowing is a process of successive escalations of concerns raised with re-
cipients at different stages of an internal-external continuum. Whistleblowers disclose infor-
mation depending on responses (including non-responses) to their earlier whistleblowing at-
tempts. Further, organizations and regulators might or might not publish information about 
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whistleblowing activity. This model resulted in four modes of facilitation. For each of these I 
reasoned the effect on entropy in the infosphere according to disclosure tier and whether the 
whistleblowing was true or false. 
The analysis finds that whistleblowing to the public is good if and only if whistleblowing is 
true, is facilitated by credible media, and there had not been a previous adequate response by 
the organization or regulator. At earlier stages of the whistleblowing process, whistleblowing 
is good if there is an adequate response. When there is no adequate response, whistleblowing 
is good if and only if whistleblowing is true and the concern is raised again at the next level 
(further whistleblowing). 
The implication is that from an ecopoietic perspective we cannot evaluate whistleblowing 
without also taking into account how the whistleblowing was facilitated. The analysis in this 
paper suggest that for whistleblowing to be beneficial within IE, facilitation must: 
1. filter out false whistleblowing, 
2. achieve closure with the whistleblower, especially when whistleblowing is mistaken 
or intentionally false, and 
3. include the publication of information about whistleblowing activity. 
One implication for practitioners and policy makers is that whistleblowing policies need to 
operate on a duty to investigate basis so as to ensure untrue whistleblowing can be document-
ed and explained. Another implication is that whistleblowing policies need to be implemented 
in a culture of engagement with the whistleblower so as to achieve closure and hence pre-
empt the need to escalate the concern further. Currently, informing the whistleblower of the 
outcome of an investigation is a standard element of whistleblowing policies. From an IE 
perspective it might not be enough to send the whistleblower a simple notification. Rather, 
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the findings suggest a closer involvement of the whistleblower in resolving the wrongdoing 
or explaining how the whistleblower was mistaken would be needed. 
Finally, the analysis in this paper also suggests that publishing information about whistle-
blowing activity can be beneficial for the infosphere. Further research can provide insights 
into useful parameters for this (how to aggregate the data under categories) as well as what 
first mover disadvantages might be. Improving responding to whistleblowing at early stages 
however remains a priority. This entails not only an ability to make a distinction between 
mistaken and intentionally false whistleblowing but also a managerial ability to achieve clo-
sure. 
Overall, an ecopoietic analysis of whistleblowing from an IE perspective provides a norma-
tive justification for an emerging regulatory position with regard to whistleblowing in the 
USA (SEC) and the UK (FCA) showing a stronger attention for adequate responses to inter-
nal whistleblowing and publishing data on whistleblowing activity, because whistleblowing 
to the media is hardly ever an optimal facilitation of whistleblowing. 
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Table 1. Modes of facilitating whistleblowing and entropy effects 
Tier True/False r Ʌ s r Ʌ ¬s ¬r Ʌ s ¬r Ʌ ¬s
1 organiza-
tion
True ↓ = ↑ if not esc ↑ if not esc
False ↓ = ↑ if esc ↑ if esc
2 regulator True ↓ = ↑ if not esc ↑ if not esc
False ↓ = ↑ if esc ↑ if esc
3 public True ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
False = = ↑ ↑
